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Items tagged with: security

OMG. Just… no.

#InternetOfShit #IoT #TroyHunt #Security #InfoSec #RemoteControlDetonator
 
OMG. Just… no.

#InternetOfShit #IoT #TroyHunt #Security #InfoSec #RemoteControlDetonator
 

FBI recommends passphrases over password complexity | ZDNet


Correct horse battery staple

#password #security
 
Bild/Foto

Private WhatsApp groups visible in Google searches

Your #WhatsApp groups may not be as secure as you think they are


Google is indexing invite links to private WhatsApp group chats. This means with a simple search anyone can discover and join these groups including ones the administrator may want to keep private.

Does #Google care about your privacy and security? No.

Does #Facebook honestly care about your privacy and security? No.

https://www.dw.com/en/private-whatsapp-groups-visible-in-google-searches/a-52468603

#Facebook #chat #apps #privacy #security #surveillance #messaging #im
 
Bild/Foto

Private WhatsApp groups visible in Google searches

Your #WhatsApp groups may not be as secure as you think they are


Google is indexing invite links to private WhatsApp group chats. This means with a simple search anyone can discover and join these groups including ones the administrator may want to keep private.

Does #Google care about your privacy and security? No.

Does #Facebook honestly care about your privacy and security? No.

https://www.dw.com/en/private-whatsapp-groups-visible-in-google-searches/a-52468603

#Facebook #chat #apps #privacy #security #surveillance #messaging #im
 
Bild/Foto

Private WhatsApp groups visible in Google searches

Your #WhatsApp groups may not be as secure as you think they are


Google is indexing invite links to private WhatsApp group chats. This means with a simple search anyone can discover and join these groups including ones the administrator may want to keep private.

Does #Google care about your privacy and security? No.

Does #Facebook honestly care about your privacy and security? No.

https://www.dw.com/en/private-whatsapp-groups-visible-in-google-searches/a-52468603

#Facebook #chat #apps #privacy #security #surveillance #messaging #im
 

SHA-1 is a Shambles

First Chosen-Prefix Collision on SHA-1 and Application to the PGP Web of Trust


https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/014.pdf

Below is the abstract from the article. The most concerning thing here is the ability to forge signatures of keys. As you know if you read my posts, I have always argued that we should never sign other people's keys. Even without the problem of possible forged signatures using the technique in the article, key-signing harms privacy.

The only key signature created by EasyGPG is the signature on a newly created key pair.

printf "${newkeyattr}" | env TZ=UTC gpg --homedir "${keydir}" --batch --use-agent --cert-digest-algo "SHA512" --s2k-cipher-algo "AES256" --s2k-digest-algo "SHA512" --s2k-mode 3 --s2k-count 32000000 --status-file "${temp}" --gen-key 2> /dev/null

Notice that SHA512 is used. As for signatures on messages and encrypted files, see below (after the abstract). EasyGPG always uses SHA512.

Abstract. The SHA-1 hash function was designed in 1995 and has been widely used
during two decades. A theoretical collision attack was first proposed in 2004 [WYY05],
but due to its high complexity it was only implemented in practice in 2017, using
a large GPU cluster [SBK + 17]. More recently, an almost practical chosen-prefix
collision attack against SHA-1 has been proposed [LP19]. This more powerful attack
allows to build colliding messages with two arbitrary prefixes, which is much more
threatening for real protocols.
In this paper, we report the first practical implementation of this attack, and its
impact on real-world security with a PGP/GnuPG impersonation attack. We managed
to significantly reduce the complexity of collisions attack against SHA-1: on an Nvidia
GTX 970, identical-prefix collisions can now be computed with a complexity of 2 61.2
rather than 2 64.7 , and chosen-prefix collisions with a complexity of 2 63.4 rather than
2 67.1 . When renting cheap GPUs, this translates to a cost of 11k US$ for a collision,
and 45k US$ for a chosen-prefix collision, within the means of academic researchers.
Our actual attack required two months of computations using 900 Nvidia GTX 1060
GPUs (we paid 75k US$ because GPU prices were higher, and we wasted some time
preparing the attack).
Therefore, the same attacks that have been practical on MD5 since 2009 are now
practical on SHA-1. In particular, chosen-prefix collisions can break signature schemes
and handshake security in secure channel protocols (TLS, SSH). We strongly advise
to remove SHA-1 from those type of applications as soon as possible.
We exemplify our cryptanalysis by creating a pair of PGP/GnuPG keys with different
identities, but colliding SHA-1 certificates. A SHA-1 certification of the first key can
therefore be transferred to the second key, leading to a forgery. This proves that
SHA-1 signatures now offers virtually no security in practice. The legacy branch of
GnuPG still uses SHA-1 by default for identity certifications, but after notifying the
authors, the modern branch now rejects SHA-1 signatures (the issue is tracked as
CVE-2019-14855).
Keywords:
$ grep "gpg" easygpg.sh | grep " -s " 
  encryptedText=`printf "%s\n" "${theText}" | gpg --homedir "${keydir}" -a --trust-model always --textmode -s -u "${senderID}" -e ${recipients} --no-emit-version --no-encrypt-to --personal-digest-preferences "SHA512 SHA384 SHA256" --personal-compress-preferences "ZLIB BZIP2 ZIP" --personal-cipher-preferences "AES256 TWOFISH CAMELLIA256 AES192 AES" --use-agent --no-tty -` 
  printf "%s\n" "${theText}" | gpg --homedir "${keydir}" -a --trust-model always --textmode -s -u "${senderID}" --no-emit-version --personal-digest-preferences "SHA512 SHA384 SHA256" --personal-compress-preferences "ZLIB BZIP2 ZIP" --personal-cipher-preferences "AES256 TWOFISH CAMELLIA256 AES192 AES" --use-agent --no-tty - | xclip -i -selection clipboard 
      (tar --numeric-owner -c "$(basename "${filename}")" | gpg --homedir "${keydir}" --trust-model always -a -s -u "${senderID}" -e ${recipients} --no-emit-version --no-encrypt-to --personal-digest-preferences "SHA512 SHA384 SHA256" --personal-compress-preferences "ZLIB BZIP2 ZIP" --personal-cipher-preferences "AES256 TWOFISH CAMELLIA256 AES192 AES" --use-agent --no-tty --yes -o "${savepath}" -) | zenity --progress --text="Encrypting..." --pulsate --auto-close --no-cancel 
      (tar --numeric-owner -c "$(basename "${filename}")" | gpg --homedir "${keydir}" --trust-model always -s -u "${senderID}" -e ${recipients} --no-emit-version --no-encrypt-to --personal-digest-preferences "SHA512 SHA384 SHA256" --personal-compress-preferences "ZLIB BZIP2 ZIP" --personal-cipher-preferences "AES256 TWOFISH CAMELLIA256 AES192 AES" --use-agent --no-tty --yes -o "${savepath}" -) | zenity --progress --text="Encrypting..." --pulsate --auto-close --no-cancel 
    tar --numeric-owner -c "$(basename "${filename}")" | gpg --homedir "${keydir}" -a --trust-model always -s -u "${senderID}" --no-emit-version --personal-digest-preferences "SHA512 SHA384 SHA256" --personal-compress-preferences "ZLIB BZIP2 ZIP" --personal-cipher-preferences "AES256 TWOFISH CAMELLIA256 AES192 AES" --use-agent --no-tty --yes -o "${savepath}" - 
    printf "%s\n" "${theText}" | gpg --homedir "${keydir}" -a --trust-model always --textmode -s -u "${senderID}" -e -R "${senderID}" --no-emit-version --no-encrypt-to --personal-digest-preferences "SHA512 SHA384 SHA256" --personal-compress-preferences "ZLIB BZIP2 ZIP" --personal-cipher-preferences "AES256 TWOFISH CAMELLIA256 AES192 AES" --use-agent --no-tty - > "${savepath}" 
    printf "%s\n" "${theText}" | gpg --homedir "${keydir}" -a --trust-model always --textmode -s -u "${senderID}" -e -R "${senderID}" --no-emit-version --no-encrypt-to --personal-digest-preferences "SHA512 SHA384 SHA256" --personal-compress-preferences "ZLIB BZIP2 ZIP" --personal-cipher-preferences "AES256 TWOFISH CAMELLIA256 AES192 AES" --use-agent --no-tty - > "${savepath}"

#easygpg #gpg #encryption #privacy #surveillance #security #cryptography
 

SHA-1 is a Shambles

First Chosen-Prefix Collision on SHA-1 and Application to the PGP Web of Trust


https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/014.pdf

Below is the abstract from the article. The most concerning thing here is the ability to forge signatures of keys. As you know if you read my posts, I have always argued that we should never sign other people's keys. Even without the problem of possible forged signatures using the technique in the article, key-signing harms privacy.

The only key signature created by EasyGPG is the signature on a newly created key pair.

printf "${newkeyattr}" | env TZ=UTC gpg --homedir "${keydir}" --batch --use-agent --cert-digest-algo "SHA512" --s2k-cipher-algo "AES256" --s2k-digest-algo "SHA512" --s2k-mode 3 --s2k-count 32000000 --status-file "${temp}" --gen-key 2> /dev/null

Notice that SHA512 is used. As for signatures on messages and encrypted files, see below (after the abstract). EasyGPG always uses SHA512.

Abstract. The SHA-1 hash function was designed in 1995 and has been widely used
during two decades. A theoretical collision attack was first proposed in 2004 [WYY05],
but due to its high complexity it was only implemented in practice in 2017, using
a large GPU cluster [SBK + 17]. More recently, an almost practical chosen-prefix
collision attack against SHA-1 has been proposed [LP19]. This more powerful attack
allows to build colliding messages with two arbitrary prefixes, which is much more
threatening for real protocols.
In this paper, we report the first practical implementation of this attack, and its
impact on real-world security with a PGP/GnuPG impersonation attack. We managed
to significantly reduce the complexity of collisions attack against SHA-1: on an Nvidia
GTX 970, identical-prefix collisions can now be computed with a complexity of 2 61.2
rather than 2 64.7 , and chosen-prefix collisions with a complexity of 2 63.4 rather than
2 67.1 . When renting cheap GPUs, this translates to a cost of 11k US$ for a collision,
and 45k US$ for a chosen-prefix collision, within the means of academic researchers.
Our actual attack required two months of computations using 900 Nvidia GTX 1060
GPUs (we paid 75k US$ because GPU prices were higher, and we wasted some time
preparing the attack).
Therefore, the same attacks that have been practical on MD5 since 2009 are now
practical on SHA-1. In particular, chosen-prefix collisions can break signature schemes
and handshake security in secure channel protocols (TLS, SSH). We strongly advise
to remove SHA-1 from those type of applications as soon as possible.
We exemplify our cryptanalysis by creating a pair of PGP/GnuPG keys with different
identities, but colliding SHA-1 certificates. A SHA-1 certification of the first key can
therefore be transferred to the second key, leading to a forgery. This proves that
SHA-1 signatures now offers virtually no security in practice. The legacy branch of
GnuPG still uses SHA-1 by default for identity certifications, but after notifying the
authors, the modern branch now rejects SHA-1 signatures (the issue is tracked as
CVE-2019-14855).
Keywords:
$ grep "gpg" easygpg.sh | grep " -s " 
  encryptedText=`printf "%s\n" "${theText}" | gpg --homedir "${keydir}" -a --trust-model always --textmode -s -u "${senderID}" -e ${recipients} --no-emit-version --no-encrypt-to --personal-digest-preferences "SHA512 SHA384 SHA256" --personal-compress-preferences "ZLIB BZIP2 ZIP" --personal-cipher-preferences "AES256 TWOFISH CAMELLIA256 AES192 AES" --use-agent --no-tty -` 
  printf "%s\n" "${theText}" | gpg --homedir "${keydir}" -a --trust-model always --textmode -s -u "${senderID}" --no-emit-version --personal-digest-preferences "SHA512 SHA384 SHA256" --personal-compress-preferences "ZLIB BZIP2 ZIP" --personal-cipher-preferences "AES256 TWOFISH CAMELLIA256 AES192 AES" --use-agent --no-tty - | xclip -i -selection clipboard 
      (tar --numeric-owner -c "$(basename "${filename}")" | gpg --homedir "${keydir}" --trust-model always -a -s -u "${senderID}" -e ${recipients} --no-emit-version --no-encrypt-to --personal-digest-preferences "SHA512 SHA384 SHA256" --personal-compress-preferences "ZLIB BZIP2 ZIP" --personal-cipher-preferences "AES256 TWOFISH CAMELLIA256 AES192 AES" --use-agent --no-tty --yes -o "${savepath}" -) | zenity --progress --text="Encrypting..." --pulsate --auto-close --no-cancel 
      (tar --numeric-owner -c "$(basename "${filename}")" | gpg --homedir "${keydir}" --trust-model always -s -u "${senderID}" -e ${recipients} --no-emit-version --no-encrypt-to --personal-digest-preferences "SHA512 SHA384 SHA256" --personal-compress-preferences "ZLIB BZIP2 ZIP" --personal-cipher-preferences "AES256 TWOFISH CAMELLIA256 AES192 AES" --use-agent --no-tty --yes -o "${savepath}" -) | zenity --progress --text="Encrypting..." --pulsate --auto-close --no-cancel 
    tar --numeric-owner -c "$(basename "${filename}")" | gpg --homedir "${keydir}" -a --trust-model always -s -u "${senderID}" --no-emit-version --personal-digest-preferences "SHA512 SHA384 SHA256" --personal-compress-preferences "ZLIB BZIP2 ZIP" --personal-cipher-preferences "AES256 TWOFISH CAMELLIA256 AES192 AES" --use-agent --no-tty --yes -o "${savepath}" - 
    printf "%s\n" "${theText}" | gpg --homedir "${keydir}" -a --trust-model always --textmode -s -u "${senderID}" -e -R "${senderID}" --no-emit-version --no-encrypt-to --personal-digest-preferences "SHA512 SHA384 SHA256" --personal-compress-preferences "ZLIB BZIP2 ZIP" --personal-cipher-preferences "AES256 TWOFISH CAMELLIA256 AES192 AES" --use-agent --no-tty - > "${savepath}" 
    printf "%s\n" "${theText}" | gpg --homedir "${keydir}" -a --trust-model always --textmode -s -u "${senderID}" -e -R "${senderID}" --no-emit-version --no-encrypt-to --personal-digest-preferences "SHA512 SHA384 SHA256" --personal-compress-preferences "ZLIB BZIP2 ZIP" --personal-cipher-preferences "AES256 TWOFISH CAMELLIA256 AES192 AES" --use-agent --no-tty - > "${savepath}"

#easygpg #gpg #encryption #privacy #surveillance #security #cryptography
 

#UK #police deny responsibility for poster urging parents to report kids for using #Kali #Linux


source: https://www.zdnet.com/article/uk-police-distance-themselves-from-poster-warning-parents-to-report-kids-for-using-kali-linux/
Virtual machines, the #Tor Browser, Kali Linux, #WiFi Pineapple, #Discord, and #Metasploit are all deemed terrible finds and the poster urges parents to call the cops "so we can give advice and engage them into positive diversions."
Just a few years ago I would have been burnt at the stake.

#Danger #Warning #fail #Technology #Security #Crime #Cyber #children #news
 

#UK #police deny responsibility for poster urging parents to report kids for using #Kali #Linux


source: https://www.zdnet.com/article/uk-police-distance-themselves-from-poster-warning-parents-to-report-kids-for-using-kali-linux/
Virtual machines, the #Tor Browser, Kali Linux, #WiFi Pineapple, #Discord, and #Metasploit are all deemed terrible finds and the poster urges parents to call the cops "so we can give advice and engage them into positive diversions."
Just a few years ago I would have been burnt at the stake.

#Danger #Warning #fail #Technology #Security #Crime #Cyber #children #news
 
Shared via Fedilab @realramnit@chaos.social 🔗 https://chaos.social/users/realramnit/statuses/103645804448003773

Die Loki-Foundation hat sich den #Signal-Quellcode genommen und eine der größten Schwächen des Messengers entfernt - die Telefonnummernabhängigkeit!

Außerdem routen sie sämtlichen Traffic durch Tor. Das macht "Session" - wie der neue Messenger getauft wurde - zu einem interessanten Delta-Chat-Konkurrenten.

https://getsession.org/

#Session #Signal #Messenger #Chat # Privacy #Security

chaos.social: Matthias Kneiss (@realramnit@chaos.social) (Matthias Kneiss)

 
Shared via Fedilab @realramnit@chaos.social 🔗 https://chaos.social/users/realramnit/statuses/103645804448003773

Die Loki-Foundation hat sich den #Signal-Quellcode genommen und eine der größten Schwächen des Messengers entfernt - die Telefonnummernabhängigkeit!

Außerdem routen sie sämtlichen Traffic durch Tor. Das macht "Session" - wie der neue Messenger getauft wurde - zu einem interessanten Delta-Chat-Konkurrenten.

https://getsession.org/

#Session #Signal #Messenger #Chat # Privacy #Security

chaos.social: Matthias Kneiss (@realramnit@chaos.social) (Matthias Kneiss)

 
Bild/Foto
This image is typical of the current state of #cyber #security.

#code #source #lol #fail #fun #humor
 
Seems like #elasticsearch is the new #mongodb
How come people don't secure their installations?#
#security
 
Oops
#starbucks #security
 

media.ccc.de - Hirne Hacken


Sehr sehenswerter Votrag über die "Schwachstelle Mensch" im Bereich Passwortischerheit.
#security #36C3 #psychologie

media.ccc.de: Hirne Hacken

 
#centos #security
CentOS 8: sechs Wochen ohne Updates
 
#WordPress 5.3.1 #Security and Maintenance Release
WordPress 5.3.1 Security and Maintenance Release
 
Das Hersteller immer noch nicht verstanden haben, daß dies die schlechteste aller Strategien im Umgang mit Sicherheitslücken ist.

Mal von dem Umstand abgesehen, daß unverschlüsselte Kommunikation seit mindestens fünf Jahren obsolet sein sollte.

Ja, das war das böse Konjunktiv: sollte.

Update ohne Auth auf dem Zielserver? Unverschlüsselt?
Da ist dann aber doch wenigstens die Updatedatei durch Signaturen geschützt, oder?
Ein Angreifer hätte nun versuchen können, diesen Hash selbst zu berechnen. Aber das war gar nicht notwendig. In unseren Tests reichte es bereits, den entsprechenden Eintrag namens "dirhash" leer zu lassen. Einen leeren Wert akzeptierte Quincy als gültig und führte anschließend die von uns manipulierte setup.exe aus. Der Angriff funktionierte auf diese Weise mit der Version von Quincy, die zum Zeitpunkt unserer Tests Ende Oktober aktuell war
https://glm.io/145428

#FrauStreisand #Security #Software

Hersteller um Stellungnahme gebeten, Anwaltskanzlei antwortet https://www.golem.de/print.php?a=145428 RT Dr. Streisand bitte zur Post-Mortem-Analyse in Station 23, Dr. Streisand bitte https://twitter.com/nitram2342/status/1204531431214637058 #Quincy
Europa 
 

Datenleck: Daten von 20 Millionen Mixcloud-Nutzern im Darknet - Golem.de


@Herr Von Sinnen Nutzt du nicht den Dienst?

#mixcloud #security #leak
 
Officials warn about the dangers of using public USB charging stations | ZDNet

Using USB condoms...
#usb #security
 

How terrible software design decisions led to Uber’s deadly 2018 crash


https://arstechnica.com/cars/2019/11/how-terrible-software-design-decisions-led-to-ubers-deadly-2018-crash/
The NTSB report includes a second-by-second timeline showing what the software was "thinking" as it approached Herzberg, who was pushing a bicycle across a multi-lane road far from any crosswalk:

- 5.2 seconds before impact, the system classified her as an "other" object.
- 4.2 seconds before impact, she was reclassified as a vehicle.
- Between 3.8 and 2.7 seconds before impact, the classification alternated several times between "vehicle" and "other."
- 2.6 seconds before impact, the system classified Herzberg and her bike as a bicycle.
- 1.5 seconds before impact she became "unknown."
- 1.2 seconds before impact she became a "bicycle" again.
#uber, #security, #self-driving-car
 

How terrible software design decisions led to Uber’s deadly 2018 crash


https://arstechnica.com/cars/2019/11/how-terrible-software-design-decisions-led-to-ubers-deadly-2018-crash/
The NTSB report includes a second-by-second timeline showing what the software was "thinking" as it approached Herzberg, who was pushing a bicycle across a multi-lane road far from any crosswalk:

- 5.2 seconds before impact, the system classified her as an "other" object.
- 4.2 seconds before impact, she was reclassified as a vehicle.
- Between 3.8 and 2.7 seconds before impact, the classification alternated several times between "vehicle" and "other."
- 2.6 seconds before impact, the system classified Herzberg and her bike as a bicycle.
- 1.5 seconds before impact she became "unknown."
- 1.2 seconds before impact she became a "bicycle" again.
#uber, #security, #self-driving-car
 
#OPNsense 19.7.6 released opnsense.org/opnsense-19-7-… #security #update
OPNsense 19.7.6 released
 
/* Somit ist startpage nun verbrannt */ #security
Startpage verkauft Firmen-Anteile an System1 LLC
Startpage verkauft Firmen-Anteile an System1 LLC
 
.WAVs Hide Malware in Their Depths in Innovative Campaign | Threatpost
#security creative
.WAVs Hide Malware in Their Depths in Innovative Campaign
 

Twitter "Unintentionally" Used Your Phone Number for Targeted Advertising


#security #socialnetworks #electronicfrontierfoundation #eff #digitalrights #digitalprivacy
posted by pod_feeder_v2
 

Twitter "Unintentionally" Used Your Phone Number for Targeted Advertising


#security #socialnetworks #electronicfrontierfoundation #eff #digitalrights #digitalprivacy
posted by pod_feeder_v2
 

Twitter "Unintentionally" Used Your Phone Number for Targeted Advertising


#security #socialnetworks #electronicfrontierfoundation #eff #digitalrights #digitalprivacy
posted by pod_feeder_v2
 
Überwachungsfirma FinFisher geht mit Anwälten gegen unsere kritische Berichterstattung vor




#Netzpolitik #FinFisher #Überwachung #Surveillance #Security #Privacy #Internet
Überwachungsfirma FinFisher geht mit Anwälten gegen unsere kritische Berichterstattung vor
 
Überwachungsfirma FinFisher geht mit Anwälten gegen unsere kritische Berichterstattung vor




#Netzpolitik #FinFisher #Überwachung #Surveillance #Security #Privacy #Internet
Überwachungsfirma FinFisher geht mit Anwälten gegen unsere kritische Berichterstattung vor
 
#security #hacker #browser #Chrome #Firefox

Russian hacker group patches Chrome and Firefox to fingerprint TLS traffic | ZDNet



A Russian cyber-espionage hacker group has been spotted using a novel technique that involves patching locally installed browsers like Chrome and Firefox in order to modify the browsers' internal components.

The end goal of these modifications is to alter the way the two browsers set up HTTPS connections, and add a per-victim fingerprint for the TLS-encrypted web traffic that originates from the infected computers.
 
#security #hacker #browser #Chrome #Firefox

Russian hacker group patches Chrome and Firefox to fingerprint TLS traffic | ZDNet



A Russian cyber-espionage hacker group has been spotted using a novel technique that involves patching locally installed browsers like Chrome and Firefox in order to modify the browsers' internal components.

The end goal of these modifications is to alter the way the two browsers set up HTTPS connections, and add a per-victim fingerprint for the TLS-encrypted web traffic that originates from the infected computers.
 

Why Do Nigerian Scammers Say They are From Nigeria? - Microsoft Research


That's very fascinating
#scam #Nigeria #security
Why Do Nigerian Scammers Say They are From Nigeria?
 
Here’s why so many apps are asking to use Bluetooth on iOS 13 #security
 

UK cybersecurity agency warns devs to drop Python 2 due to looming EOL & security risks | ZDNet


https://www.zdnet.com/article/uk-cybersecurity-agency-warns-devs-to-drop-python-2-due-to-looming-eol-security-risks/
#programming #security
 

UK cybersecurity agency warns devs to drop Python 2 due to looming EOL & security risks | ZDNet


https://www.zdnet.com/article/uk-cybersecurity-agency-warns-devs-to-drop-python-2-due-to-looming-eol-security-risks/
#programming #security
 
 

He tried to prank the DMV. Then his vanity license plate backfired big time.


When you register NULL as licence plate!
#security #SQL #fail #programming
 
And yet another idiot in a long line of politicians who don't understand encryption and security. Either something is secure and nobody can get in, or you have a backdoor and it's open not only to governments but also all the bad guys. It's as simple as that.
Tory home secretary says government should be allowed to read people’s WhatsApp messages | The Independent
#UK #politics #messaging #encryption #security #homeoffice #homesecretary #WhatsApp
 

No, you don't need to uninstall VLC


#vlc #security
 
Nice harsh overview about the issues with PGP, beyond the recent key spam attacks. #security #pgp
 
😆 Wie geil ist das denn bitte?

https://www.giga.de/news/einbrecher-raeumen-haus-leer-lassen-ipad-und-mac-absichtlich-da/

Ist mir aber auch passiert. Als in Brasilien war wurde bei mir eingebrochen. Mein Mac stand noch da. 👍
Das mag ich so an Apple. Keiner klaut ein iPhone oder nen Mac. Wozu auch?

#Apple #Security
 
😆 Wie geil ist das denn bitte?

https://www.giga.de/news/einbrecher-raeumen-haus-leer-lassen-ipad-und-mac-absichtlich-da/

Ist mir aber auch passiert. Als in Brasilien war wurde bei mir eingebrochen. Mein Mac stand noch da. 👍
Das mag ich so an Apple. Keiner klaut ein iPhone oder nen Mac. Wozu auch?

#Apple #Security
 
Komoot: Facebook geht mit auf Tour kuketz-blog.de/komoot-faceboo… #security
 
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