The one thing you should never do with a scapegoat is to kill it and eat it. The EU scapegoat has now been ritually sacrificed to the gods of national identity in the hope that they will in turn bestow the greatness that holds Britain together. When the gods do not respond to the sacrifice, the people often turn their wrath on the high priests.#UK #EU #Brexit #England #politics #Tories #Conservatives #scapegoat
The 12 December anniversary of Boris Johnson’s “stonking” election victory over the weakest opposition in memory looms, and what a year it has been. Not so much an annus horribilis as what our classically-trained Prime Minister might, in another context, call the “annus horribilissimus”. Deep within me I can summon a modicum of sympathy for our Great Dear Leader. To be hit by the Covid-19 pandemic so early in his term was cruel. Even Johnson’s hero, Winston Churchill, would have struggled. But the pandemic has exposed him for the weak, vacillating and incompetent leader that he is, and the country is paying an appalling price. He failed to prepare for the first wave in the spring, or the second wave in the autumn. He failed to stockpile PPE, protect care homes, provide testing or impose swift lockdowns. Lacking a coherent strategy, he has “veered like a shopping trolley” between authoritarianism and libertarianism, between science and political expediency, between saving lives and saving the economy. Now we’ve been granted a brief respite from our terrible tiers so we can go out and spread the virus for five days over Christmas. The result is the worst of all possible worlds. Despite spending more money fighting Covid-19 (£280bn and rising) than any other G7 country save Canada, we have also suffered the second highest death rate after Italy. [See also: The biggest mistakes made by Boris Johnson's government during the Covid-19 crisis] The pandemic was unavoidable. Brexit was a choice. Last summer the European Union (having mysteriously survived all those Brexiteer predictions of its imminent collapse) offered to extend the transition period beyond 31 December, but Johnson in his wisdom said no. Thus chaos will be piled on chaos a month from now. A post-Christmas surge in Covid will almost certainly coincide with bedlam at our ports, disrupted supply lines, higher prices, and shortages of food, fuel and medicines. An economy forecast to contract by 11.3 per cent in 2020 (its worst performance since 1709) will suffer several more percentage points of lost growth over the next few years with or without the “oven ready” deal Johnson repeatedly promised us 12 months ago. All those trade agreements he promised have failed to materialise – not even one with Trump’s America. His “global Britain” is cutting foreign aid, disbanding the Department for International Development, cracking down on immigration and consumed by a narrow, mean-spirited nationalism. The pandemic has destroyed the myth that our small island can raise the drawbridge and “take back control” in this age of globalisation. Far from strengthening the United Kingdom, Brexit is hastening its disintegration as support for Scottish independence surges and Northern Ireland’s fragile peace comes under threat. Far from becoming a low-tax, low-regulation Singapore-on-Thames, we face a mountain of new red tape and higher taxes to fill the black hole in the public finances. As the costs of Brexit have become ever more apparent, and the benefits ever more illusory, who but a handful of crazed zealots will be celebrating our “liberation” on New Year’s Eve? And how extraordinary that in last week’s spending review statement, Rishi Sunak failed to mention Brexit once, its enormous economic consequences notwithstanding? Even among its advocates Brexit has become a taboo subject, a dirty word. Covid and Brexit apart, Johnson faces a third grave charge, namely that his shameful conduct has debased his office, weakened the institutions of government with all their checks and balances, and tarnished Britain’s reputation in the world. He has explicitly condoned the breaking of international law. He has undermined cabinet government by stuffing his own with pliant mediocrities (remember them all dutifully tweeting their support for Dominic Cummings after he blatantly breached the lockdown rules?). He has sought to bypass parliament and politicise the civil service. He has attempted to cow the judiciary and independent media. [See also: How Priti Patel became unsackable] The list goes on. He has ousted honest and capable public servants, often through smears and anonymous briefings, while rewarding cronies with jobs, peerages and lucrative contracts. No other prime minister has been reprimanded by the Commissioner for Public Appointments, as Johnson was last month, for “packing the composition of interview panels with allies” and “the growth of unregulated appointments”. He has brazenly and shamelessly refused to dismiss ministers and top aides no matter how egregious their transgressions. He stood by Priti Patel despite a report concluding that she bullied civil servants, prompting his adviser on ministerial standards to resign in protest. He stood by Gavin Williamson despite the A-level results fiasco. He kept Cummings despite his Barnard Castle escapade. He ignored Robert Jenrick’s malodorous approval of Richard Desmond’s £1bn housing development. He refused to suspend a Tory MP accused of rape, but removed the whip from another Conservative, Julian Lewis, who won election as chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee and published the report into Russian interference in British politics. Instead of seeking to unite our fractured country, Johnson has frequently taunted the half of the country that voted Remain. He governs through infantile three-word slogans. He prefers fantastical visions – UK space commands and wind farms powering every British home within nine years – to policies rooted in reality. If he really wants Britain to be the “world leader” in green energy, why not end the ten-year freeze on fuel duty? Johnson is so profligate with public money that senior civil servants have sought an unprecedented 17 “ministerial directions” to signal disagreement with spending decisions they consider risky or wasteful. He has obfuscated, dissembled and played fast and loose with facts, earning at least two rebukes from the UK Statistics Authority. He has made so many vacuous promises – of “world-beating” apps, of putting a “tiger in the tank” of the Brexit talks, of sending the virus packing within 12 weeks, by the summer, by Christmas, by next Easter – that he has lost all credibility. As John Major observed in a brilliant speech on 9 November, “false optimism is deceit by another name”. A year on from Johnson’s election victory, I struggle to think of a single way in which the country has benefited from his premiership, and I’m evidently not alone. His approval rating has plunged to -24. Labour has overtaken the Tories in the polls. Despite an 80-seat majority he struggles to win key parliamentary votes. He has squandered the support even of the slavishly sycophantic Tory press, and the process of “levelling up” seems to be going into reverse. The good news is that our floundering featherweight of a prime minister has finally been forced to jettison Cummings and his Vote Leave henchmen in favour of apparent grown-ups such as Simon Case and Dan Rosenfield – and that there are now only four years left until the next election. [See also: The US's nightmare is finally over but the UK's is just beginning]www.newstatesman.com
'I’m 29 with no underlying health conditions. This is serious s**t. Please please wake up guys'www.manchestereveningnews.co.uk
#Cars #Motoring #Automotive #Mini #England #OnThisDayOn this day in motoring - Tuesday 18th August 1959
http://www.365daysofmotoring.com/showonthisday/article/12829
On This Day
Tuesday 18th August 1959
61 years ago
The first pictures of BMC’s new compact four-seater Mini, designed by Alec Issigonis, were revealed to the press. Designated by Leonard Lord as project ADO15 (Amalgamated Drawing Office project number 15) and the product of the Morris design team, the Mini came about because of a fuel shortage caused by the 1956 Suez Crisis. Petrol was once again rationed in the UK, sales of large cars slumped, and the market for German bubble cars boomed. Lord, the somewhat autocratic head of BMC, reportedly detested these cars so much that he vowed to rid the streets of them and design a 'proper miniature car'. He laid down some basic design requirements: the car should be contained within a box that measured 10×4×4 feet (3.0×1.2×1.2 m); and the passenger accommodation should occupy 6 feet (1.8 m) of the 10-foot (3.0 m) length; and the engine, for reasons of cost, should be an existing unit. Issigonis, who had been working for Alvis, had been recruited back to BMC in 1955 and, with his skills in designing small cars, was a natural for the task. The team that designed the Mini was remarkably small: as well as Issigonis, there was Jack Daniels (who had worked with him on the Morris Minor), Chris Kingham (who had been with him at Alvis), two engineering students and four draughtsmen. Together, by October 1957, they had designed and built the original prototype, which was affectionately named "The Orange Box" because of its colour. The ADO15 used a conventional BMC A-Series four-cylinder, water-cooled engine, but departed from tradition by mounting it transversely, with the engine-oil-lubricated, four-speed transmission in the sump, and by employing front-wheel drive. Almost all small front-wheel-drive cars developed since have used a similar configuration, except with the transmission usually separately enclosed rather than using the engine oil. The radiator was mounted at the left side of the car so that the engine-mounted fan could be retained, but with reversed pitch so that it blew air into the natural low pressure area under the front wing. This location saved vehicle length, but had the disadvantage of feeding the radiator with air that had been heated by passing over the engine. It also exposed the entire ignition system to the direct ingress of rainwater through the grille. The suspension system, designed by Issigonis's friend Dr. Alex Moulton at Moulton Developments Limited, used compact rubber cones instead of conventional springs. This space-saving design also featured rising progressive-rate springing of the cones, and provided some natural damping, in addition to the normal dampers. Built into the subframes, the rubber cone system gave a raw and bumpy ride accentuated by the woven-webbing seats, but the rigidity of the rubber cones, together with the wheels' positioning at the corners of the car, gave the Mini go kart-like handling. Initially an interconnected fluid system was planned, similar to the one that Alec Issigonis and Alex Moulton were working on in the mid-1950s at Alvis. They had assessed the mechanically interconnected Citroën 2CV suspension at that time (according to an interview by Moulton with Car Magazine in the late 1990s),[citation needed] which inspired the design of the Hydrolastic suspension system for the Mini and Morris/Austin 1100, to try to keep the benefits of the 2CV system (ride comfort, body levelling, keeping the roadwheel under good control and the tyres in contact with the road), but with added roll stiffness that the 2CV lacked. The short development time of the car meant this was not ready in time for the Mini's launch. The system intended for the Mini was further developed and the hydrolastic system was first used on the Morris 1100, launched in 1962; the Mini gained the system later in 1964. Ten-inch (254 mm) wheels were specified, so new tyres had to be developed, the initial contract going to Dunlop. Issigonis went to Dunlop stating that he wanted even smaller, 8 in (203 mm) wheels (even though he had already settled on ten-inch). An agreement was made on the ten-inch size, after Dunlop rejected the eight-inch proposition. Sliding windows allowed storage pockets in the hollow doors; reportedly Issigonis sized them to fit a bottle of Gordon's Gin. The boot lid was hinged at the bottom so that the car could be driven with it open to increase luggage space. On early cars the number plate was hinged at the top so that it could swing down to remain visible when the boot lid was open. This feature was later discontinued after it was discovered that exhaust gases could leak into the cockpit when the boot was open. The Mini was designed as a monocoque shell with welded seams visible on the outside of the car running down the A and C pillars, and between the body and the floor pan. Those that ran from the base of the A-pillar to the wheel well were described as 'everted' (lit., 'turned outward') to provide more room for the front seat occupants. To further simplify construction, the hinges for the doors and boot lid were mounted externally. Production models differed from the prototypes by the addition of front and rear subframes to the unibody to take the suspension loads, and by having the engine mounted the other way round, with the carburettor at the back rather than at the front. This layout required an extra gear between engine and transmission to reverse the direction of rotation at the input to the transmission. Having the carburettor behind the engine reduced carburettor icing, but the distributor was then exposed to water coming in through the grille. The engine size was reduced from 948 to 848 cc (57.9 to 51.7 cu in); this, in conjunction with a small increase in the car's width, cut the top speed from 90 to 72 mph (145 to 116 km/h). In 1959, BMC and Alec Issigonis won the Dewar Trophy, for the design and production of the Mini. The Mini shape had become so well known that by the 1990s, Rover Group – the heirs to BMC – were able to register its design as a trademark in its own right.
The first pictures of BMC’s new compact four-seater Mini, designed by Alec Issigonis, were revealed to the press. Designated by Leonard Lord as project ADO15 (Amalgamated Drawing Office project number 15) and the product of the Morris design team, the Mini came about because of a fuel shortage caused by the 1956 Suez Crisis. Petrol was once again rationed in the UK, sales of large cars slumped, and the market for German bubble cars boomed. Lord, the somewhat autocratic head of BMC, reportedly detested these cars so much that he vowed to rid the streets of them and design a 'proper miniature car'. He laid down some basic design requirements: the car should be contained within a box that measured 10×4×4 feet (3.0×1.2×1.2 m); and the passenger accommodation should occupy 6 feet (1.8 m) of the 10-foot (3.0 m) length; and the engine, for reasons of cost, should be an existing unit. Issigonis, who had been working for Alvis, had been recruited back to BMC in 1955 and, with his skills in designing small cars, was a natural for the task. The team that designed the Mini was remarkably small: as well as Issigonis, there was Jack Daniels (who had worked with him on the Morris Minor), Chris Kingham (who had been with him at Alvis), two engineering students and four draughtsmen. Together, by October 1957, they had designed and built the original prototype, which was affectionately namedwww.365daysofmotoring.com
A recent study suggests that after 1066, English food was as terrible but filling as before.
😂 😂 😂
#science #England
A recent study suggests that after 1066, English food was as terrible but filling as before.arstechnica.com
Speaker says PM cannot bring back deal to parliament without substantial changeswww.theguardian.com